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The Economics of Loans to Informal Groups of 
Small Farmers in Low Income Countries 
by 
Dale W Adams 
The past few years a number of low income countries have 
attempted to increase the loans made to agriculture in general 
and to small farmers in particular. These efforts have been 
morally and financially supported by various international banks 
and aid agencies [7].** A variety of strategies have been used, 
especially in attempts to increase the amount of loans made to 
small farmers. These include massive increases in the overall 
credit available, with the hope that some would filter down to the 
rural poor. Recent examples of this strategy are Brazil and 
Thailand. Another popular technique has been to place various 
loan portfolio restrictions on lenders in order to force more lend-
ing to small farmers, the Philippines and the Dominican Republic 
being examples. Many countries have also used concessionary re-
discount rates on central bank facilities or loan guarantees as 
ways of inducing more lending to small farmers. Creating new, 
specialized credit institutions or programs exclusively to service 
small farmers has also been popular. Numerous supervised credit 
programs in Latin America and small farmer credit programs in 
India are examples of this approach. 
* Professor of Agricultural Economics, The Ohio State University. 
** Refers to citations listed at the end of the paper under 
References. 
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Although expansion in lending to small farmers has occurred 
in a few countries, the overall results from these various stra-
tegies have been disappointing. In a few countries the purchas-
ing power of the total formal loans going to small farmers have 
declined, not increased. Many of the administrative fiats aimed 
at forcing lenders to lend to small farmers have been ignored 
or their original interest evaded. Careful analysis of small 
farmer credit programs or agencies several years after their in-
itiation often shows they are essentially bankrupt, that they are 
heavily dependent on government subsidies, or that they are no 
longer serving primarily small farmers. These problems have been 
accompanied, in some cases, by loan repayment difficulties. 
A number of lenders have found that loans to borrowers of 
small amounts are costly, that many of these borrowers have un-
satisfactory loan collateral, and that too many of these small 
loans are not repaid. It also appears that some potential small 
borrowers have been discouraged from seeking loans because of 
the time, effort and costs associated with transacting a formal 
loan. In most cases both supply and demand problems are impeding 
the flow o~ loans to small farmers. 
In attempts to overcome some of these problems, formal lenders 
in a number of countries have been experimenting with making loans 
to informal groups of small farmers [4]. In a few countries like 
Thailand, Mexico, Ghana, Chile, and the Philippines, a large part 
of the formal loans going to small farmers moves through these 
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informal groups [5, 9, 10, 12]. In other countries like Malawi, 
the Dominican Republic, and Bolivia, group lending is done more 
on a pilot project basis [1]. Several countries such as Turkey 
and Japan have had experience with group lending which goes 
back a number of decades. Other countries like Bangladesh (The 
Uttara Bank) and Sri Lanka are just beginning to experiment with 
this technique. 
At least four economic advantages are claimed for group 
lending: (1) lender loan transaction costs are reduced, (2) joint 
liability for the loan causes internal group pressure for repay-
ment and thus reduces defaults, (3) borrowing through a group 
reduces the average borrower's loan transaction costs, and 
(4) the group can be used as an efficient way of introducing 
other productive services such as extension and technical training. 
In many cases non-economic goals are also sought through 
these groups. Informal credit programs in some countries are 
stepping stones; organizers view them as pre-cooperatives which 
might evolve into formal cooperatives. In other cases the groups 
are used to make members socially and politically active. Through 
group action, organizers hope to induce changes in the way par-
ticipants view themselves and also force changes in organizations 
which might provide services to the rural poor [8]. Since very 
little careful analysis of the results of group lending has been 
done, the discussion which follows is quite conjectural. Emphasis 
is placed on classifying the major issues and on trying to ask the 
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right questions rather than giving hard and fast answers. Two 
major questions are addressed. First, how can viable groups be 
formed or strengthened? Second, what role can group loans play 
in improving financial services available for the rural poor? 
Organizing Groups 
Three general approaches have been used to form credit 
groups. At one extreme, a small number of potential borrowers 
from a single lender have been hurriedly drawn together for the 
sole purpose of getting a group loan [9]. At the other extreme, 
organizers of groups may spend many months or even several years 
helping to evolve viable groups which then begin to borrow col-
lectively [3, 13, 14]. Still another approach has been to use 
groups formed earlier by some other agency, or to use groups 
which have existed for some time for other purposes, as a basis 
for group lending. 
Most people who have worked in organizing these groups 
readily admit there is more art than science in their efforts. 
It appears, however, that at least five conditions must be met 
if group action is to be elicited successfully [6, 11]. First, 
individuals who engage in group action usually do so for selfish 
reasons. They must realize some organizational good. That is, 
they must get some good, service or satisfaction through the group 
which could not be obtained individually at reasonable costs. 
Second, if the group activities include productive goods or service: 
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the individual must be able to convert these into profitable 
investments. The net returns on these activities must be com-
petitive with other activities which the participant can do in-
dividually. The net returns must also compensate the participant 
for the loss of individual discretion involved in being a member 
of a group, and also the individual costs of maintaining group 
membership. 
Third, viable groups must provide more or less equal access 
to all members to the organizational good. It is difficult, for 
example, to maintain a credit group if only the leaders of the 
group have access to the concessionary credit. Fourth, the op-
timum size of a group will depend largely on the purposes of the 
group. The larger the group, the more difficult it is to main-
tain a common interest. And, the larger the group the easier it 
is to have a factional takeover. Fifth, for groups to have long-
evity they must have political acceptance. This may mean legal 
recognition or simply political support for the formation and 
existence of groups. 
Too little research has been done on group organization to 
draw a blueprint for their construction. Information from several 
countries strongly suggests, however, that groups solely formed 
to gain access to concessionary credit do not work very well. An 
elete faction often captures most of the "sweet money" for them-
selves. 
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Role of Groups in Financial Intermediation 
The primary justification for forming credit groups varies 
across countries. In some cases groups are viewed as a way of 
reducing the lender's transaction costs for making small loans. 
In o0her cases the groups are mainly used to try and increase 
rates of loan repayment through some joint liability or peer 
pressure. Still other groups are formed to achieve a variety 
of purposes only one of which is to provide financial services 
to the rural poor. 
Lender Transaction Costs 
Lenders incur four types of costs in making loans. These 
are: (1) the expenses of acquiring the funds which are lent, 
(2) the transaction costs of making and administering the loan, 
(3) the losses incurred when some loans are not repaid, and 
(4) profits or economic surpluses needed to pay owners of the 
financial institutions. When small loans are involved, the loan 
transaction costs are a very important part of the lender's total 
cost considerations. For most formal lenders the transaction 
costs per unit of money lent varies inversely with the size of 
t~e loan. Transaction costs are essentially the same regardless 
of the size of loan. Lenders do, however, experience substantial 
differences in loan transaction costs between loans to customers 
of long standing and new borrowers. It is often costly for a 
lender to assemble sufficient information to assign a reliable 
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repayment probability to a new borrower. Thus, other things 
being equal, individual loans to new small borrowers are doubly 
undesirable for most formal lenders. 
Potentially, ~aking loans to groups of new small borrowers 
should sharply reduce the lender's loan transaction costs per 
unit of money lent, when compared to small individual loans. 
This assumes, of course, that the lender does not have to incur 
substantial promotional costs to help form the group and intro-
duce the group to the procedures for getting formal loans. Group 
lending may or may not help to reduce the lender's costs of es-
tablishing the new borrower's repayment potential. If the group 
has a track record in other successful activities, the lender 
may be able to conclude rather quickly that there is enough 
group cohesion to assure loan repayment. On the other hand, if 
the group is new, the lenders may be saddled with doubts about 
the viability of the group as well as with doubts about the ca-
pacity and willingness of members to repay loans. 
Improving Repayment 
A number of group lending programs are aimed at improving 
loan repayme~t performance. There are at least four ways in 
which groups might work to improve repayment. First, group 
members ~ay be held jointly liable for repaying the loan. If 
one member does not repay, other members are obligated to cover 
the entire debt. Second, groups may be cohesive enough so that 
group pressure is placed on members who are slow to repay. Third, 
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some of the group's activities may include marketing a major 
part of the produce of its members. If this is the case, the 
group may be able to assure repayment by withholding part of 
the proceeds from sales to cover debt repayment. Fourth, the 
group may be forced to pledge as loan collateral some asset 
which they jointly own. An innovative World Bank project in 
Malawi uses this technique. In this project, group members are 
forced to deposit with the lending agency 20 percent of the value 
of their total group loan in a blocked, group savings account. 
If the group fully repays its loan, the savings plus interest 
are returned to the group. Shortfalls in repayment are deducted 
from the deposit. 
The actual repayment record in group lending is mixed. 
Programs in Malawi, Mexico (Puebla), and the Dominican Republic 
appear to have very satisfactory repayment records [2, 5]. Re-
payment results in the Philippines and Ghana, on the other hand, 
have been much less satisfactory [9, 12]. At least in the Philip-
pines, group lending appears to have had no positive effect on 
repayment performance. In many credit groups in the Philippines 
there has been almost no peer group pressure applied on members 
to repay. In some cases, if one member of the group has been 
unwilling or unable to repay, the entire group has refused to pay. 
The factors which cause some groups to be successful in im-
proving loan repayment while other groups are unsuccessful are 
not clearly understood. The following factors, however, appear to 
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be positively associated with successful groups: (1) groups 
which borrow short-term do better in repaying than groups which 
borrow long-term, (2) groups organized just to get credit do 
not perform as well as multipurpose groups, (3) groups made up 
of relatively homogeneous members perform better than groups 
which are highly stratified, (4) group loans made for a single 
enterprise or crop are more often repaid than multi-purpose 
loans, (5) loans to groups of individuals who have some solidar-
ity before formal grouping are quite often repaid, and (6) group 
loans made by well administered organizations are more often 
repaid than loans made by badly run financial institutions. 
In a few cases it appears that loan repayment is low because 
the quality of the financial services provided to the group are 
poor or very unpredictable. The services may be so poor that 
the individual borrowers feel the benefits from keeping the bor-
rowed money are greater than the cost associated with loss of 
a good credit rating. 
Borrower's Loan Transaction Costs 
Transacting loans involve costs for both the lender and 
the borrower. The lender's transaction costs are well understood, 
but very little attention has been given to the importance of non-
interest, loan transaction costs incurred by the borrower. These 
borrower costs include work time lost in order to negotiate the 
loan, travel costs to visit the lender, loan paperwork costs, 
and in some cases, bribes to speed the loan application process. 
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Typically, new borrowers find their loan transaction costs are 
much higher than experienced borrowers. In some cases formal 
lenders shift part of their normal loan transaction costs to 
the borrower, or artificially raise the borrower's loan trans-
action costs through delays and forcing the borrower to make 
many visits to the lender. This tactic is used when lenders 
want to discourage certain kinds of unprofitable lending with-
out taking overt actions. 
In theory, at least, group lending should reduce the bor-
rower's loan transaction costs. Ideally, only a couple of the 
members of the group should find it necessary to visit the lender 
to negotiate the loan. A few innovative lenders have even 
developed mobile banking services which bring the "bank" to the 
borrowers on a regular basis. Some lenders also arrange for in-
puts, purchased with the loan, to be delivered in bulk to the 
borrowing group. This further reduces the borrower's costs of 
acquiring these inputs. These reductions in borrower's costs 
make the loan more valuable to the borrower, and also stimulate 
loan demand. 
In practice, some group lending does not appear to substan-
tially reduce borrower's loan transaction costs. Some lenders, 
at least in the Philippines, force each borrower to visit the 
bank to sign forms. In other cases, borrowers may view attending 
periodic compulsory group meetings as a part of their loan trans-
action costs. Forced savings programs which do not include satis-
factory returns on savings deposits may also be viewed by borrower~ 
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as part of their costs of getting a group loan. As mentioned 
earlier, loss of some individual liberties under a group loan 
may also be viewed as a cost of getting a group loan. The pos-
sibilities of being held liable for someone else's unpaid debt 
may also be viewed as a cost of using group credit. If these 
expected costs are substantial, one should not be surprised to 
see individuals drop out of group lending programs, even when 
concessionary interest rates are involved. Inexpensive credit 
may not be cheap if additional borrower loan transaction costs 
are substantial. 
Non-Loan Purposes 
A final economic justification for forming groups is that 
other complementary productive services, besides loans, can be 
more efficiently provided to groups than to individuals. The 
group can be used as a way to introduce new technology or improved 
production practices; extension agents can share their information 
in group meetings. It might also be possible for the group to 
carry out some land preparation, land improvement, or marketing 
activity which would be less efficiently done individually. Un-
fortunately, very little research has been done on these issues 
and little can be said about their relative importance. Some 
research done in the Philippines, Bolivia and the Dominican 
Republic, however, suggests that the technical education which 
accompanies most group loans is not very useful nor is it very 
effective. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is too little information available to allow informed 
judgements about the effectivenss of group loans in providing 
financial services to the rural poor. Recently completed re-
search in the Philippines, and research underway in Thailand, 
Bolivia and the Dominican Republic should allow the drawing of 
some generalization in the near future. 
If group lending does not prove to be an effective way of 
reducing both lender and borrower loan transaction costs and 
also improving loan repayment, some other major innovation will 
be needed to help provide financial services to the rural poor 
in low income countries. 
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